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The aftermath of the Libyan conflict and the country 
instability continues due to the internal political division echo 
of the Arab Spring and the overall fragile regional context 
strongly influenced by external powers seeking to impact on 
the direction the country takes socio-economically and 
politically. In post-Qaddafi Libya the long transition to 
sustainable institutions and peace remains fragile. The tensions 
between political parties, armed groups and non-state security 
actors with different ideological preferences resulted in the 
full-scale civil war that broke out in the mid-2014. The large 
arsenal inherited from Qaddafi regime fell under the armed 
groups and non-state security actors control increasing the 
already vast proliferation of weapons escalating political 
tensions and polarization between religious and secular actors. 
This research aims to examine the transition process in the 
post-conflict Libya assessing the political developments within 
the broader aspects of regional peace, stability and security 
and in reverse how the political instability in Libya affects 
broader regional security, the growth of violent extremism and 
uncontrolled acute forced migrations through Libya’s porous 
border. Libya is a strategic partner and an international player 
for the EU engaged with the emerging power in the 
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focuses - beside foster a sustainable economic system – on preserve peace 
and prevent conflict strengthening its relations with its neighboring 
countries to maintain security in the region. To reach national, regional and 
international security is necessary to recognize security as a political matter 
to be reflected in a long-term process part of the governance reform and 
economic development through a coherent and effective inter-policy 
approach. In the case of Libya as any other case, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the national interest and national priorities and the need for 
case-by-case analysis tailoring international support to transform a state of 
insecurity into a state of peace coordinating short and long term policies 
and actions and visioning the nexus between security and development to 
restore peace in the country and in the region.  
 





Political Islam has been a very active form of political expression since 
the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Mandaville, 2007, 195; Buckley, 2012, 91). 
Actually, in the following few decades political Islam began to be an 
alternative to the influence of socialism and nationalism across the Middle 
East and Asia and an increasing presence of the Gulf’s state interest in 
North Africa, Middle East and the Horn of Africa. This was especially 
apparent after the end of the Cold War and with the beginning of the Arab 
Spring that brought about the significant social-political, economic and 
security changes and transformations. The increase of political parties 
inclined towards political Islam had significant impact on the evolution of 
the political landscape, revolutions, elections and stability of the Muslim 
countries, including present-day Libya (Murray & Aidan, 2001, 86-108). 
Although Libyan religious actors such as Libyan Islamic Movement for 
Change had played the significant role in the overthrow of the Qaddafi 
regime, it is significant to acknowledge the involvement of this political 
party and likewise political parties constructive involvement in the political 
processes towards, peace, stability and human security. When one talk 
about religious political parties, it is important to mention that they had 
undergone significant fragmentation. Actually, the so-called Muslim 
Brotherhood gave birth to several political parties with similar political and 
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ideological preferences; for instance, it is important to mention the Justice 
and Construction Party (JCP) or al-Watan (Nadine, 2016, 60-75). Study the 
ideological preferences of these political parties provides information on 
the reasoning behind their alliance during the crisis and the civil war as for 
the case of Libya dominated by political parties with a religious political 
affiliation and others political parties with secular political inclination. 
Political parties with religious ideological preferences have been struggling 
to ensure their political place regardless of a viable political settlement or 
situation whereby the civil war and violence is taking place remaining on 
the political arena since the beginning of the conflict, during the crisis and 
instability and in the absence of a viable system of governance. The 
challenge remains to differentiate how religious political parties involved 
in the political process to bring about security impacted on Libya political 
development and stability contrary to the radical and violent political 
parties engaged to disrupt the process. 
The developments in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt also contributed to the 
emergence of religious political activism in Libya. In all these countries, 
especially after the Arab Spring, including Libya, religion has played a 
significant role in the civil war and subsequently in the political processes. 
What are in particular political manifesto, strategies, agenda and 
ideological objectives of the emerging religious political parties? It is almost 
impossible to understand the Arab Spring, the uprising that followed and 
the attempts to democratize countries long lasting dominated by 
authoritarian rules across the Muslim world without understanding the 
role of religion (Blanchard, 2014, 3). In this regard, Libya has not been an 
exception because the role of religion in politics has been greatly 
manifested in country like Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. The impact of political 
parties religiously lead in Libya it could be compared with the other 
Muslim countries where the role of religion in politics has been more or less 
effective. In 2011, different political actors played a role in the armed 
revolution against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi, followed by a civil 
war and years of instability till nowadays. In Libya revolutionary lead by 
religious political preferences played a critical role in toppling Muammar 
Qaddafi’s regime with open NATO support (Buckley, 2012, 81-83). 
According to Dagi (2017), the UN adopted the Resolution 1973 to justify its 
involvement in Libya to implement Chapter VII and the United Nations 
Security Council tasks to “maintain or restore international peace and 
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security,” and in the case of Libya the threat and the aggression of 
Muammar Qaddafi against its own citizens.  
During the revolution the religious political parties, sided with the 
National transitional Council in Bengasi and after in Tripoli with the 
elected government to be an integral part of the transitional process toward 
the country’s democratization via elections, and constitutional changes. 
However, within much political, economic and social unrest some of the 
religious political parties radicalized inciting and participating in the 
violent clashes across the country threatening the peace process in Libya. 
After 2011, religious political parties played a significant role in the 
election processes. Thus, these political parties saw an opportunity in using 
the political and institutional framework for fostering their political and 
ideological objectives and constructively engaging in the media, elections, 
and judiciary democratization process. However, since 2014 the military 
action of General Khalifa Hefter in the Cyrenaica against the Islamic armed 
groups, the position of religious political parties began to change from 
constructive to a much more radical role (Barfi, 2014, 3-6). Religious 
political parties felt compelled to actively engage in the conflictive political 
scene in an open armed confrontation in alternative to the so-called soft 
politics. 
 
2. Peace and Security Predicaments in Libya 
 
The Libyan political landscape remains fragmented and fluid, inclusive 
of the numerous challenges that a post conflict scenario present; from the 
Prime Ministers Mahmoud Jibril to Al Tarhouni and from Abdem Rahim 
el-Kib to Ali Zidan and finally to the government of Tobruk of Abdullah al 
Thani and the Government of Tripoli of Fayez Al Sarraj there has been a 
constant attempted to act prudently prioritizing the need to complete their 
mandates until the election against an effective and courageous 
implementation of the peace process, refraining to take up challenges and 
engage in the reforming of the security governance due to the conflictive 
political climate and the lack of political cohesion. External actors criticized 
the ineffectiveness and the lack of vision of the Libyan governments. 
However it could be argued that transform a complex, fragmented political 
scenario dominated by “proxy” interests is risky and challenging and quick 
positive impact on individual’s life are highly improbable. In spite several 
electoral processes the Libyan’s government suffered the post-election 
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legitimization of its political management as part of the political process the 
governments failed to address the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of the armed groups and the non-state security 
providers in the urban and rural area of the country. The government also 
failed to address the reconciliation and justice reform process. Romanet 
Perroux (2015) articulated these problems by stating, 
One telling indicator of this bureaucratic failure in the three years 
following the end of the 2011 revolution was the inability of the transitional 
governments to spend their allocated budgets. This was because ministries 
were paralyzed by their lack of specialized staff and their need for clear 
and detailed directives. Typically, decision-making and implementation 
required multiple signatures from various departments and bureaucratic 
echelons in order to assuage the concerns of civil servants (p. 4).  
The political scenario has been characterized by a sense of mistrust 
among the legislative, the executive bodies, the armed groups and the civil 
society. Since the National Transitional Council the government struggled 
in addressing the former revolutionaries, re-organized into armed groups 
and non-state security actors, and the state security management overall 
failing in providing security policy direction within re-organized national 
security architecture. Within the executive there is no separation between 
the policy-makers, the administration and operational level and plans are 
being implemented bereft of any policy guidance or sector’s strategy; there 
is no capacity within the administration to act strategically in the short term 
due to several factors: (a) absence of inter-ministerial coordination; (b) 
ministries unclear division of competencies and overlapping 
responsibilities; (c) internal political struggle for key positions within 
ministries; (d) lack of political cohesion between the central government 
and the periphery; (e) absence of a legal and regulatory framework to 
guarantee the implementation of the rule of law and the governance 
transparency; (f) lack of expertise within the public administration and 
poor infrastructures. For instance, both the ministry of justice and the 
ministry of the interior suffered and still do from relatively limited 
financial resources (given the wealth of the country), poor structural, 
management and administrative capabilities, weak oversight, and 
inadequate capacities for strategic planning; weak institutions were a 
hallmark of Qaddafi’s Libya (Nadine, 2016, 99-111; Blanchard, 2014, 31).  
The inability of the government to communicate with the public increase 
and the negative perception of the civil society toward the political 
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management revealed its limited knowledge in managing public affairs. 
Therefore, the inefficient and undeveloped public administration 
functioning does not support transparency; instead instigate civil society 
demonstrations to protest against the government actions, for (a) lack of 
transparency; (b) the excessive presence of Muammar Qaddafi loyalist 
within the public administration (c) lack of transparency of the central bank 
and other financial institutions; (d) lack of improvement of the living 
conditions for majority of Libyans; (d) lack of transparency in the 
distribution of economic resources and illegal appropriation of resources. 
According to Romanet Perroux (2015), the civil society has to encounter the 
failure of its politics, the lack of state institutions and a narrow 
communalism (p. 3-4). Thus, the attempt to re-organize the public 
administration sector is slow and confused but not indicative of a country 
ready to relapse into armed conflict. In communications with the security 
section, stakeholders emerge a positive political will for the country to 
move forward. 
 
3. An Institutional Assessment of Security Institutions in Libya 
 
In the volatile and often inaccessible Libyan security environment 
assessing the security management and who is managing security is 
difficult. The Warrior Affair’s Commission, renamed today Reintegration 
and Development Commission was initially charged with the process of 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of freedom fighters 
from the recent conflict (Blanchard, 2014, 10). The Warrior Affairs ‘s 
Commission had an innovative approach and instead of following the DDR 
traditional path encouraged the reintegration of the freedom fighters into 
public administration and private sector before disarmament. The WAC 
was one of those few institutions that already in 2011 had a vision, a 
strategy and a plan to address the fighters and revolutionaries integration 
to de-conflict instigating a spontaneous participation of the freedom 
fighters into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. To 
implement a DDR process in a country like Libya, were there are not 
neutral entities to handover weapons, is highly improbable. In the history 
of recent conflicts DDR operationalization has been conducted by the 
United Nations peacekeepers or other regional organizations but in Libya 
these conditions were not applicable. Which of the many freedom fighter’s 
brigade would voluntarily and spontaneous render their weapons and to 
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whom? Therefore the idea of the WAC could have been successful beside 
innovative in promoting “self- disarmament.” Sawani (2017) is right in 
asserting that besides “developing special programs for realizing this goal 
of reintegrating fighters, it is necessary to syncing and correlating these 
programs with a sustainable peace and reconciliation strategy, To 
implement a DDR process is need it a political agreement among all parties 
including those who have to be disarmed and are not institutionally 
represented. The DDR is a conducive process to establish peace and 
security toward stability and democratic transition” (p. 172-173). In this 
regard, the EU with its international partners also fostered the DDR agenda 
and program as to direct the country towards the peace-building and 
institution-building process. Consequently, for such a purpose the EU 
significantly supported the agenda set by the Libyan Political Agreement 
signed in Skhirat in December 2015 (Battiss, Luengocabrera & Morillas, 
2016, 19).  
A Warrior Affairs Commission (WAC) database was established to 
manage the process of “reintegration” (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015, 13). 
The database was and still is an incredible source of information not only 
about the “individual thwar” - freedom fighters - but about the number of 
brigades formed during the uprising and after in each town in Libya. It 
provides the name of the commander’s brigade, and it gives a picture of the 
geo-political and geo-military formation of the armed groups. For instance, 
only in Tripoli it was accounted 1796 brigades and addresses of where the 
brigades were located. Already 80.000 weapons were declared and 
registered; through the registration it was acknowledged that there were no 
women fighters registered among the 230,000 freedom fighters; women 
were not in combat neither dealt with logistic. The thwar that registered 
with the WAC did not take any salary/money/benefit as this was against 
the WAC’s policy. The WAC had analyzed several other DDR process in 
other countries and the payment of the freedom fighter was proven to be 
unsuccessful. It is certain that a large number of individuals registered with 
the WAC, although they were never in combat and they were seeking for 
employment. A total of 70.000 thwar were registered with the ministry of 
internal affairs 25,000 with the ministry of labor and 16,000 with ministry of 
defense bringing the number to 341,000 “thwar” which corresponded to the 
number of the unemployed in Libya (Sharqieh, 2013, 17). Unfortunately the 
WAC did not receive the support required - by the state’s budget and 
external donors - to reintegrate the fighters into private sector or public 
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administration function. It could be said that it was a missed opportunity 
conducive to the failure of the DDR process. It failed the expectation of 
those many freedom fighters that were ready to move from war to peace. 
Twar expectations were and are still high; they considered reintegration 
through employment the reward for the fight for the country’s freedom. Thwar’s 
dissatisfaction caused discontent, which often result in civil disturbance 
presenting a real threat to restore peace in the country (Muggah & 
O’Donnell, 2015, 9-10; Mohammad Sawani, 2017, 176-177). The widespread 
of arms and ammunitions in the country was the consequence of the vast 
ammunition storage area (ASA) bombed by the NATO and controlled by 
the local armed groups and non-state security actors. A large number of 
those arms were illegally sold and also used in other conflicts, like in Syria 
or Somalia by the insurgency. Unfortunately the DDR process has not been 
successful and has contributed to the instability and insecurity that is still 
affecting Libya. DDR remain a challenge in any conflict or post conflict 
scenario putting at risk the peace and delay the institutional development 
and state formation 
The rule of law, transnational justice, reconciliation, and human rights 
are other sectors that contribute to de-conflict and improve state and 
human security in Libya. The identification of the missing persons for 
instance is one of the crucial aspects of the transnational justice and 
reconciliation process. The Ministry for Wounded, Martyrs and Missing 
Persons was established to manage the identification of the missing persons 
In Libya the exhumation of bodies from mass graves started back in 2011 
on the request of the family of the victim’s that actively participated in the 
identification process providing their DNA after being fully informed on 
the implications and the further steps required to implement the process. 
The “Commission on the Search and Identification of Missing Persons, was 
set up by the National Transitional Council during the revolution in 2011 
and in November 2012 the Libyan Minister for the Affairs of Families of 
Martyrs and of Missing Persons, Naser Jibril Hamed, signed in Tripoli an 
agreement with the International Commission for Missing Person (ICMP) 
on cooperation to identify missing persons cases from the recent conflicts as 
well as from the 42-year regime of Muammar Qaddafi 
The Commission on the Search and Identification of Missing Persons 
was staffed with prominent international scientists, including forensic 
experts, to investigate those who had disappeared” (Van Lier, 2017, 16). 
However, the process required more attention. DNA for instance should 
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not be donated without a law on Data protection and a legal framework to 
protect the privacy of the family of the victims and to regulate the process; 
exhumation should be conducted according to the rule of procedures and 
the best international practices. Three countries offered support to the 
Commission (MoM), USA, Finland and South Korea (Mohammad Sawani, 
2017, 180-184).  
The transitional justice process has been delayed by the lack of 
consensus among the political parties and civil society. Several conferences 
have been held with speakers from countries that undergone Transitional 
Justice and Reconciliation process and established Commission for Truth 
and Reconciliation such as Colombia, South Africa, Rwanda. The 
suggestions from previous experiences considered that one of the key 
factors that are the base to a reconciliation process is to agree on a new 
Constitution (Van Lier, 2017, 8-12; Geha & Volpi, 2016, 687-706). Legislation 
has been often unclear and characterized by a poor language and vague 
formulation that doesn’t address the legal interpretation of laws in the 
court of justice. Often legislation passed resembles the legislation at the 
time of Muammar Qaddafi. An example could be the law passed by the 
National Transitional Council that granted legal immunity to any action 
that was undertaken in the effort to rid the country of Colonel Qaddafi 
granting impunity to war crimes committed during the revolution and civil 
war for both military and civilian acts. These laws challenged the 
international laws as they granted immunity/impunity to crime against 
humanity and war crime to the freedom fighters when the concept of the 
law shall embrace both loyalists to the former regime and the freedom 
fighters. The law included persecuting individuals from towns and cities 
that were suspected to be pro-Qaddafi, and the regular use of torture in 
detention centers (Van Lier, 2017, 5-12). The acceptance of the law granting 
impunity to those who killed civilians, torture and murder in detention 
centers was against the principle of the revolution itself, the fight for 
freedom and the idea to abide to the rule of law in Libya against an unjust 
regime. Someone argued that the law aimed to convince the thwar to hand 
over the weapons and guarantee them immunity and protection 
(Fukutomi, 2017, 30-31). For instance, United Nations Mission Support in 
Libya (UNSMIL) the civil society and the Libyan judicial authorities have 
negatively assessed Laws 35, 37 and 38, passed by the National 
Transnational Council (NTC). Law 37 addressed the glorification of the 
dictator and any criticism to the Libyan flag, government and other 
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institutions encroaching on freedom of expression. Law 37 was the copy of 
the previous Qaddafi’s law interpreting the regime’s restriction of freedom 
of expression. On a positive note was the Law 38 that obliged the transfer 
of the detainees from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to the 
Ministry of Justice with the obligation to refer them to the public 
prosecutors and not the military courts unless they were immediately to be 
released.  
Since February 2012, the resumption of judicial activity was hampered 
by institutional weaknesses and the deficits of the courts, some of which 
were barely functioning due to lack of adequate security measures, and the 
absence of judges and administrative staff (Van Lier, 2017, 14). Court’s 
administration under the former regime was characterized by many of the 
same deficiencies of the Libyan public administration. Corruption was 
prevalent among the administrative staff of the court and other auxiliaries 
of justice. The case management system was not developed, while the 
automation of the courts was in its very early stages. 
Under Qaddafi regime, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, public defenders 
and members of the legal department in the government were considered 
by law to constitute one single corps, violating the principle of the 
immovability of the judges, and thus their independence. Lawyers’ 
syndicates and professional networks of the legal institutions remain 
relatively underdeveloped in Libya, owing to the limitations imposed over 
the past four decades. In terms of legal competence, knowledge and 
education, Libyan judges and lawyers were considered to be at a 
comparable level with their peers in other Arab countries. Nevertheless, 
members of the judiciary suffered from a number of capacity gaps, 
particularly in the absence of knowledge development and continuous 
learning. The on-going training of judges, although existent, does not 
follow any strategic capacity building curriculum. Consequently, the 
expertise of judges, prosecutors and lawyers is ostensibly variable. The 
High Judicial Institute (HJI) remains the principal training and resource 
center for the Libyan judiciary, falling under the authority of the Minister 
of Justice. While the HJI is relatively well resourced, its capacities and 
facilities need to be improved in order to strengthen legal education and 
the competence of the judiciary (Sharqieh, 2013, 23-27). 
Owing to the existence of parallel institutions under the former regime, 
the high level of corruption, the lack of independence from the executive 
and the overlapping of ministerial competencies, ranging from the Office of 
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the Public Prosecutor to the judiciary and the police, needs to be addressed. 
The issue of large numbers of detainees awaiting trials became a growing 
concern, accompanied by increasingly allegations of torture and ill 
treatment of prisoners. Torture and ill treatment was a common feature, 
with prison officers little aware of the human rights of detainees or 
minimum standards for imprisonment. Between March and December 
2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had visited over 
8,500 detainees in approximately 60 centers; the majority of individual’s 
accused of being Qaddafi loyalists. The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights expressed continuous concern over the conditions of 
detention and treatment of detainees. These issues and the need to tackle it 
in the context of Libya’s transition are of central relevance to confidence 
building at the governance level and within the civil society that need to 
regain trust into the state institutions through the implementation of the 
rule of law. The Libyan Prison System was already suffering from 
overcrowding prior to the revolution, in part due to the large numbers of 
migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa assigned to such facilities. In 
addition, around half of the prison population was subject to prolonged 
pre-trial detention. Also detention centers existed in the country within the 
armed groups and non- state security actors facilities. In the former regime, 
the judiciary and the executive were not clearly distinct and the judiciary 
were certainly subordinated to the regime and with Act No. 3 the National 
Transitional Council issued a law to ensure separation of powers; today the 
ministry of justice has no control over the judicial authority except for the 
preparation of trials in terms of maintenance, mobilization, and protection. 
The ministry of justice is authorized to check that actions pertaining to acts 
allegedly committed by revolutionaries or others have to be prosecuted. 
The MoJ has several time stressed that thwar cannot act as judicial officers; 
therefore, whoever handles the investigations must be a judicial officer 
recognized by Libyan law to conduct official investigations in respect to the 
legislation regulation on investigation and prosecutions. Thwar were not 
authorized to conduct investigations that should only be carried out 
through judicial authorities such as the attorney general or the military 
prosecution. 
The Ministry of Defense integrated 16.000 thwar to secure the border and 
to protect the critical installations; reintegrated thwar have been used to 
sedate the conflicts in Sebha and Koufra beside other cities in Libya. 
Already in 2011 a coordination mechanism under UNSMIL was set in place 
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to coordinate among the external donors and Libyan’s authority the 
support to design the new defense architecture. The same coordination 
mechanism was established for the “commercial contracts” that the MoD 
should have signed for the army equipment in bilateral agreement with 
external donors. In the area of disarmament, much was done since 2011 and 
much remains to do to secure the stockpile ammunition and the chemical 
and nuclear material from the ammunitions storage areas (ASA). External 
donors supported and financed the Libyan Mine Action Centre to demine 
and clear the unexploded ordnance devices in urban and rural areas. The 
NATO had also assumed responsibility in providing advice to the Libyan 
authorities on security and defense governance following the request 
expressed by the Libyan Prime Minister in October 2013” (Battiss, 
Luengocabrera & Morillas, 2016, 19). 
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has competencies over the internal 
security and civil protection. However in Libya the civil protection is still 
lacking adequate infrastructures and a longstanding little interest in this 
sector. The MoI managed the voluntarily integration of thwar that moved 
from the status of freedom fighters to the one of police officers. In spite the 
increase in the number of police officers the MoI has been often obliged to 
request the support of the MoD to respond the large country widespread 
chaos among tribes, armed groups, non-state security actors that actually 
increased in terms of units and brigades since the revolution. The non-state 
security actors in the presence of hundreds are controlling the 6000 km of 
porous border with Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Niger and Chad. 
Armed groups populating the porous border are in conflict to control the 
illegal traffics of drugs, arms and illegal migrants.  
Both the MoD and the MoI have competencies over the border. The MoI 
is responsible for the internal security while the MoD is responsible for the 
border external security threats. Often between the two ministries there is 
an overlapping of jurisdiction that fuels conflicts and dispute between the 
governance due to the absence of a structured inter-ministerial 
coordination. Thus, Van Lier (2017) considered that, 
 As police forces were severely decimated and barely functioning, many 
police stations subcontracted powers of arrest and detention to local 
militias. But having to rely on such actors as the main security providers in 
many parts of the country meant that police stations themselves could not 
open cases against other militias, and courts were unable to render fair 
trials (p. 17). 
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The police is still suffering for the lack of an agreed national security 
architecture and a national security policy. The chain of command and 
control remain one among the several challenges including the lack of 
expertise and professionalism, of the security actors, the lack of equipment, 
and financial means to support the conduct of investigations and 
prosecution. Evidence of the dysfunction is that about 22 geographic 
directorates (or “security directories”) and 22 thematic directorates, used to 
- and in cases is still happening - report directly to the Minister or the vice-
minister on operations such as crowd control, swats, etc. About 131.000 
police officers and civilians are on the Ministry’s payroll, although the 
number of the Minister’s employees does not correspond to the effective 
number of employees serving in the Ministry. The office of the human 
resources of the MoI is not aware of the actual number of those police 
officers that perceive stipends. Several police officers fled during the 
revolution as they were compromised with the previous regime, some got 
killed, and a lot of them are not comfortable to go back “on the street”. 
Considering the high level of corruption, it is possible that before the 
revolution some were in the payroll but not in service. It seems that in 
Tripoli and Benghazi police stations, the level of attendance was high 
(sometimes up to 90%), while medium in administrations and very low for 
those directly reporting to Qaddafi involved in the regime intelligence, 
criminal investigations, intervention units etc. Furthermore, the working 
hours are hardly respected by police officers; the average salary of police 
officers was from 350 LYD a month for a young policeman to 900 LYD for a 
colonel; much less than a taxi driver in Tripoli which salary could be 
around 1500 LYD. Police officers serving under the MoI often have a 
second job. An investigation conducted by the MoI revealed that 75% of 
those having a high level of responsibilities tend to be corrupted. 
Increasing the salary of the police officers was and still is a possible 
deterrent against corruption. During the Qaddafi regime the police officers 
were not well trained, did not cover functions of responsibility and had no 
knowledge of the legislation regulating the internal affairs and the 
legislation on police officials including the obligation to respect individual 
and collective human rights during the arrest, the interrogation, 
prosecution and while in detention. Police districts and police stations are 
often managed by freedom fighters that could eventually be representing 
one of another tribe and its economic interest in one or another border 
trafficking area in Tripoli and in the regions especially the periphery. Some 
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like, Sharqieh (2013) considered that “Libya needs international assistance 
in building a strong police force and army – a necessary step for restoring 
state authority” (2). However even when support was provided by external 
donors to the MoI to train police officers the deployment and destination of 
the trained police officers remained a challenge. Since 2011 a large number 
of police officers and military were actually trained in the police or military 
academies of several EU countries however upon their return some among 
them joined the armed group and non-state security actors instead of the 
state security governance. 
 
4. Future Prospects and Challenges in Libya 
 
The Libyan Prime Ministers have been challenged with the re-
establishment of peace and security, election, re-organization of public 
administration, the integration of thwar and the need to reconcile a torn 
divided society. For a comprehensive understanding of the Libyan post-
conflict scenario is necessary to assess, the regional context and the 
pressure exercised by the international actors (or external donors). 
The International community formed by a multitude of actors that 
supported the revolution and arrived in Libya for a variety of reasons and 
with a variety of understandings already about what Libya and Libyans 
needed it and how to do it. The question remained how to translate vision 
into policies and policies into actions. In the absence of a Libyan’s vision for 
the short-medium objective and long-term reforming process, the external 
actors rushed to support the Libyan’s authorities proposing and imposing a 
Western model process for state formation. The multilateral and bilateral 
actors struggle to identify their interlocutors in the government to provide 
support and implement programs. Often they faced obstruction in the 
implementation due to the lack of clarity in the governance administration 
or the lack of management continuity due to daily ministerial internal 
reshuffling or political reshuffling. International democracies interlocutors 
are often the governments legitimately elected. In a country like Libya, 
internally divided and controlled by armed groups and non-state security 
actors it is necessary to include the voices of all into an all-inclusive policy 
dialogue to be able to transform a fragile political scenario into actions for 
changes and reforms. The political interlocutors for the EU and the external 
donors are not necessarily those who control the territory of the country. 
The information provided by the government recognized by the 
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international community might not have the authority to manage any 
institutions and public office outside Tripoli and even in some 
neighborhood in Tripoli. In this highly conflictive scenario what the 
external actors missed since the beginning of the peace process has been the 
communication with the actors of the revolution and their full 
inclusiveness in the policy dialogue and in the decision making process. 
The external actors have mapped the freedom fighter’s brigade financing 
research projects of academic institutions in several regions within Libya. 
However It has been difficult to conduct collect information on the freedom 
fighters due to the highly insecure and inaccessible areas and the rapid 
mutation of the freedom fighter’s formation and their alliances. The 
principle of sovereignty is within Libya might that be the one of the 
freedom fighters or the government legitimized by the election. Ignoring 
the principle of sovereignty in Libya as anywhere else does not generate 
the compulsory results for the Libyans and neither for the international 
community. The decision to opt for a Hobbesian or Weberian concept of 
state shall be left to the Libyans.  
The EU has supported the transition process in Libya from the 
beginning and established the EU Delegation to Libya in November 2011. 
Libya is considered like for the rest of the Maghreb and Mashreq a 
neighboring country which internal insecurity would dramatically impact 
on the EU security and the rest of the region. The EU funded and still does 
a large assistance programs aiming at developing the professional skills of 
the newly elected members of the parliament, support to the security sector 
and the arms and ammunitions, human rights, reconciliation and 
transitional justice process to restore peace and security in Libya with the 
full involvement and support of civil society. It provided advisors to 
support the political and constitutional process addressing the 
transformation of the security scenario from insecurity to stability. A 
mission under the European Common Security and Defense Policy has 
been established since 2012 to support the law enforcement agencies to 
control the Libya’s porous border preventing illegal migration, human 
trafficking drugs and weapons trafficking through Libya to the EU. In 2012, 
it was largely assumed that the transition roadmap set out in the 
constitutional declaration would proceed relatively smoothly under Libyan 
leadership in a nationally-owned process, and that the political and 
security situation would gradually stabilize through an effective 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR) (Crossley-
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Frolick, 2011, 37). However, the eruption of the conflict in Syria in 2012, the 
political situation in Egypt and the external actor’s interests and pressure 
strongly impact on the economic and political process in the post-
revolutionary Libya. Since the 17 February revolution of 2011, Libya 
political and security situation remain unstable and volatile and, contrary 
to earlier expectations, the country is still struggling toward stabilization. 
Political instability, frequent changes in key ministerial and administrative 
positions and a pervasive sense of unpredictability have also affected 
Libyan engagement in the reconstruction. Many of the planning 
assumptions have not yet materialized, bearing consequences for the EU 
contribution in restoring peace and security. Much of the international 
assistance has been driven by Libyan demand with the general recognition 
amongst donors that, in many cases, support has been to react instead of 
planning lacking both strategic vision and effective coordination. The 
response has been ad-hoc, rather than based on a proper assessment of how 
international donors could respond in an articulated and complementary 
manner to impact on the peace process. Moreover, the past years have 
witnessed a proliferation of arms and ammunition against the development 
of a national disarmament plan and arms control. 
The post-revolutionary political landscape in Libya remained 
fragmented as well as the in the region. The formation of the new state in 
Libya is significantly delayed and elections over the years since the 
revolutions are being inconclusive (Sawani, 2017, 55-56). The political, 
institutional and security vacuum is being exploited by actors inside and 
outside the state institutions, as well as by criminal groups dealing with 
transnational organized crimes of trafficking human beings drug and 
weapons. Central authorities remain powerless in the face of numerous 
competing power bases at local, regional and central level. Boycotts, 
intimidation, and extortion have become the standard means of exerting 
influence and pursuing agendas. Last June 2018 in the East, federalists 
forced the closure of oil terminals, thus reducing Libyan oil production 
from 1.5 million BPD to 250 000 BPD and thereby severely affecting the 
economic and fiscal situation. The government, the General National 
Congress and judicial institutions ability to govern, legislate, perform their 
duties and enforce decisions is limited due to the strong influence, pressure 
and disruption of non-state actors.  
The core problem impeding post-conflict stability is the absence of a 
political settlement that addresses core issues such as the inclusion of non-
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state security actors in the political dialogue, the functioning of the state, 
the role and separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches, national reconciliation and transitional justice, and the 
distribution of national resources and wealth. Progress on the security front 
is unlikely to materialize outside of a comprehensive and broad-based 
political consensus, as non-state security actors are unlikely to lay down 
their weapons unless a political settlement also accommodates their 
interests in the constitution and ensures them alternative means of income. 
The security scenario in Libya is highly conflictive, fragile and the 
challenges are immense. Weak-state controlled security institutions have 
enabled transnational organized crime to flourish. Kidnapping, smuggling, 
illicit- trade and racketeering, are taking root all across Libya. In the East, 
especially in Benghazi and Derna, where violent extremist groups are 
conducting a campaign of terror against security officers, state officials and 
civilians attempting to expand their activities westwards. That is why the 
EU is encouraging the Libyan authorities to counter the illicit 
proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, including man-
portable air defense systems, to secure and manage Libyaʼs borders, to 
continue to expedite its inspections regarding sanctions noncompliance, 
including illicit transfers of arms and related materiel to and from Libya, 
and the assets of individuals subject to the asset freeze established in 
resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) and modified in resolutions 2009 
(2011), 2040 (2012) and 2095 (2013) (Fukutomi, 2017, 29).  
Extensive, porous and poorly managed borders have transformed Libya 
into a regional hub for arms, drugs and human trafficking. Over the past 
several years, Libya has become the main transit country in the Maghreb 
for economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (mainly from Africa 
and more recently the Middle East) en route to Europe. In the South, 
decades of neglect and lack of perspectives for economic and social 
development reinforce local dependencies on criminal activities and 
networks. Violent clashes between Arab and Tebu communities proceed on 
a daily basis and are exacerbating the security risks and threats in the area, 
as well as local defiance of state authority. Ammunition storage area (ASA) 
bombed by the NATO operations and under the control of territorial armed 
groups like Zintan and Misrata since 2011 contributed to fuel conflicts and 
increase arms and ammunition’s proliferation. Libyan weapons stocks are 
estimated to be greater in scale than those found in Iraq and a large 
proportion of weapons stockpiles are outside the control of the state. It is 
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fully acknowledged that absent a political agreement and engagement with 
the ex-freedom fighters prevent national disarmament plan to succeed as 
well as the inability of the state to provide security countrywide. Therefore, 
Fukutomi (2017) was right in asserting that  
Libya’s post-conflict transition, however, has been disrupted by armed 
militia groups and threatened by the conflict of interim leaders. The 
situation continued to have a negative impact on the living conditions and 
security of the local population, and was aggravated by the high rate of 
gun ownership among the population in the absence of any disarmament 
and effective weapons control efforts (23). 
National security architecture has still to be fully agreed and 
implemented. State controlled security institutions and forces under a 
central chain of control and command have not yet fully developed. In 
most parts of the country, armed groups co-opted by the General National 
Congress and government remains the main providers of law and order. 
Benghazi is an exception, where the army´s Special Forces have the 
responsibility for countering insecurity, in the face of daily assassinations 
of state and military leaders. Then, efforts to disarm demobilize and 
(re)integrate ex-fighters into security structures and civilian life proceeds 
also thanks to the efforts of the Warrior Affairs Commission engaged in the 
DDR process. However, the WAC continues to meet resistance by majority 
of the armed groups to integrate into state structures due to the non-
inclusive dialogues among the parties. Those former combatants integrated 
into the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior from Misrata, 
Zintan, Benghazi, Tajoura, and Sukjuma continue to maintain their loyalties 
elsewhere, but not to the central government (Van Lier, 2017, 20-31). 
Advancements in transforming the insecure scenario into peace and 
stability have also been hindered by political instability, disunity within the 
government and tensions between the GNC and the Prime Minister unclear 
division of competencies, overlapping responsibilities and lack of inter-
ministerial coordination. Within the line ministries, the main challenges are 
insufficient resources and weak institutional and administrative capacities, 
lack of policy and strategic thinking, blurred lines and roles between the 
policy, administrative and operational levels, internal political struggles 
and competing political loyalties. The identification of reliable points of 
contact in the ministries and key actors has proven to be quite difficult and 
there is considerable resistance towards international actors.  
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security 
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transformation nexus is in the “renewal and agreement of the social 
contract” between the state and its citizenry for new bargaining, transform 
the conflict security environment and agree to cede authority (i.e., the 
obligation to obey) to a governing body in return for the social order and 
other benefits it might provide. The fundaments of the social contract lie in 
the constitution in the “bargaining for legitimacy” between the fighters, 
new security providers, their communities, and their local authorities in 
exchange of distribution of power, economic resources, social and 
economic justice. Libya new concept of security is to be found on human 
security agreed by a national dialogue among the executive, the legislative, 
the judiciary, the civil society, the political parties, the army, the police and 
the non-statutory actors. The peace process and the long-term reforming 
process, critical to re-establishing the trust and credibility for the future 
security governance, bring about a new political process to guarantee 
human development. The identification of what had mobilized individuals 
into the conflict is necessary to address the demobilization; large numbers 
of people did not make such decisions spontaneously but they were 
mobilized and persuaded and exhorted to remain in a state of war. The 
principle of ownership shall include both state and non-state actors at 
national, regional and local levels, seeking to involve as many former 
conflict parties as possible as well as the groups that have been 
marginalized or are generally under represented on the security scenario in 




Armed conflicts are defined as armed clashes between two or more 
centrally organized parties, with continuity between the clashes, in 
disputes about power over government and territory. Researchers 
generally agreed that democratic states almost never go to war on the 
contrary of the autocratic regimes that are the most war-prone and that 
economic conditions emerge as the most important explanatory factors; low 
level of economic development; a low average Gross National Product per 
capita; disproportionately large agricultural sector, etc. In the case of Libya 
the research indicated that the unequal regional distribution of wealth and 
the longest authoritarian regime since the end of World War II are the most 
important long-term causes of intra-state armed conflict.  
 For successful transition from conflict to peace and security 
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international and local policy-maker in Libya should consider the 
enhancement of effective and accountable human security within a 
framework of democratic governance lead by the rule of law principle. The 
government shall address security at the political level and translate the 
outcome into government policy regulated by a legal framework that needs 
to reflect on the country’s legal culture and tradition. The external actor’s 
agenda should be attuned with local priorities and engage at the higher 
political level to provide support to security policy and national security 
architecture instead of lowering risks responding to security policy with 
operational solutions. In a post conflict scenario where the national 
ownership is weak and the external actors replace one of the contractual 
parties promoting the western concept of social contract, the process failed 
proving the social contract has implications far beyond the community 
itself and powerfully shaped by the discourse in the national political 
system which include state and non-state actors as well. The international 
community continues to struggle with inadequate and outdated conceptual 
tools maintaining Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and the state security 
monopoly of the use of force in a centralized political and administrative 
structure disregarding Libyan’s political discourse. The centralized state 
have failed because the original social contract between the state and its 
citizens was broken and the recreation of a political and social order 
requires to be restored. If the states is not capable of providing the highest 
levels of human security in their absence predatory violence by competing 
armed groups is likely to prevail instigated by the state itself in an 
insecurity vacuum and non-state forms of governance.  
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